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ARGUMENT
For the reasons stated in its opening brief and this reply brief, Sky Ranch1 asks this
Court to reverse the trial court's rulings and remand with instructions as indicated below.
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING INVALIDATING THE
2002 DECLARATION AND INSTRUCT THE TRIAL COURT TO DECLARE THE 2002
DECLARATION VALID.

In attempting to defend the trial court's decision to declare the 2002 Declaration
void ab initio, the Association engages in a great deal of rhetorical bluster, saying that the
Declaration would turn the Development into a "bustling commercial hub with hotels, jet
aircraft, hundreds of additional lots, hundreds of additional (non-resident) airstrip users
and whatever other commercial development Sky Ranch 'in its sole discretion' saw fit to
develop." It accuses Sky Ranch of a "power grab" and says that the 2002 Declaration
made "Mr. Longley the supreme overlord of the Grassy Meadows Community." These
hyperbolic statements belie not only the utterly mundane nature of the changes between
the 1990 Declaration and the 2002 Declaration, but also common sense.2 The Court
should reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue and instruct it to declare the 2002
Declaration valid and enforceable. This Court should also instruct the trial court to
determine an appropriate award of attorney fees as per the 2002 Declaration (Ex.6 §
XII.4), including attorney fees expended on appeal.

1. As indicated in Appellant's opening brief, "Sky Ranch" refers to Appellants
collectively, and "Association" refers to the Appellee. The same method of citation to the
record shall also be used as indicated in Notes 1-4 of Appellant's Opening Brief.
2. The Development is located five miles south of Hurricane, population 13,748, on a
plot of land less than two square miles in area, accessible by means of a road that is only
paved to the south edge of the Development, with no population between it and the south
rim of the Grand Canyon, not an ideal location for a "bustling commercial hub."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

The 1990 Declaration, when considered as a whole, unambiguously
provides that Sky Ranch ys right to unilaterally amend does not lapse until
120 units in the development have been sold.

The 1990 Declaration is a restrictive covenant, which is interpreted in the same
way as a contract. View Condominium Owners Ass yn v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2005 UT 91,
Tf 21, 127 P.3d 697. When interpreting contracts, "the cardinal rule is to give effect to the
intentions of the parties, and, if possible, to glean those intentions from the contract
itself" G.GA., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App.1989). To do this, Utah
courts follow the following hierarchy of rules for contract interpretation. First, a court
looks at the plain language of the contract, considering each provision "in relation to all
of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Glenn v. Reese,
2009 UT 80,110, 225 P.3d 185. If, after examining the language of the contract and
attempting to harmonize its provisions, the courtfindsthat "it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other
facial deficiencies," the court will consider "extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent." Id.
"It is only after extrinsic evidence is considered and the court is still uncertain as to the
intentions of the parties that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter."
Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Utah App. 1988).
In its opening brief, Sky Ranch explained how, even if the provision of the 1990
Declaration that allows unilateral amendment until "80% of the lots in the community
(including additional phases as may be added) have been sold to purchasers" may be
ambiguous in isolation, the other provisions of the 1990 Declaration make it clear that the
intent of that provision was to allow Sky Ranch to unilaterally amend until 80% of the
maximum number of lots allowed in the 1990 Declaration were sold. The Association
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ignores the requirement to harmonize the document and to consider extrinsic evidence.
Instead, it skips straight to the conclusion that any language that may be ambiguous in
isolation must be construed against the drafter. This approach is contrary to Utah law and
must be rejected.
The Association argues that the trial court's interpretation of the 80% provision
does not need to be better, it just needs to be reasonable in order to conclude that the
provision is ambiguous. The Association is, in effect, arguing that even though one
interpretation of a provision is substantially more consistent with the rest of the contract
than another, the provision should still be found to be ambiguous if the other
interpretation meets some threshold of plausibility. The Association provides no authority
for this interpretation, nor does it explain what the threshold for plausibility is. Courts
tend to look at plausibility in comparison to other alternatives, not against a baseline of
plausibility. See, e.g., Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2008 UT App
405, Tj 14, 197 P.3d 659 ("In this case, the parties competing interpretations are not
equally plausible and reasonable

"); Nelson v. Betit, 937 P.2d 1298, 1304 (Utah App.

1997) ("Because the statute's plain language is susceptible to two equally plausible
interpretations, we do not find the statutory language to be as 'clear' as each party
argues."). Moreover, viewing each alternative interpretation in isolation rather than
comparing them with each other defeats the purpose of contract interpretation: rather than
determining the intent of the parties based on the contractual language, it treats every
interpretation that has some support as equally valid, obscuring intent and creating
ambiguity where none exists. This would cripple legal doctrines such as the four corners
rule and the parol evidence rule, and this Court should decline to enact such a farDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reaching change on Utah law. Finally, "to be ambiguous, both interpretations must be
plausible in the context of the contract as a whole." Merick Young Inc. v. Wal-Mart Real
Estate Business Trust, 2011 UTApp 164, f 18, 257P.3d 1031. Therefore, by showing
that the trial court's interpretation would conflict with other provisions in the 1990
Declaration and would go against the purpose of the document, Sky Ranch has shown
that the trial court's interpretation is not plausible.
Next, the Association argues that because the provision at issue contains the
phrase "Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary," the Court should not
attempt to harmonize the provision with the rest of the 1990 Declaration. In its context,
this phrase refers not to other sections of the document, but the other provisions for
amendment contained within that section. To accept the Association's alternate
interpretation, the Court would have to conclude that by invoking this phrase, the parties
intended to have the provisions of the contract conflict. That simply is not a plausible
reading of this phrase.
The Association then argues that Sky Ranch's clarification of the 80% provision in
the 2005 Declaration was an admission by Sky Ranch that the language in the 1990
Declaration was ambiguous. However, whether ambiguity exists is a question of law for
the Court to decide; whether a party believes language is ambiguous is irrelevant. Saleh v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2006 UT 20, \ 14, 133 P.3d 428. Clarifying the language in the
2005 Declaration was done in response to a dispute about the interpretation of that
provision. {See Ex.38.) However, just because parties have a dispute about the
interpretation of language does not mean that the language is ambiguous. Saleh, 2006 UT
20 at ^ 21. Just as a subsequent remedial measure is not competent evidence of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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negligence, see Utah R. Evid. 407, clarifying language in a subsequent draft does not
mean that the prior language was ambiguous.
Finally, even if this Court finds that the provision is ambiguous, the proper step
would be to remand to the trial court for further findings, as the provision cannot be
construed against the drafter until the trial court examines the extrinsic evidence and
finds that it does not resolve the ambiguity. The trial court did not do this, and so its
ruling must be reversed.
B.

The amendments contained in the 2002 Declaration were reasonable and
within the scope of Sky Ranch's power to amend.

In arguing against the validity of the challenged portions of the 2002 Declaration,
the Association reads the comparable provisions of the 1990 Declaration as narrowly as
possible, while reading the challenged provisions as broadly as possible. This is
improper. In resolving a facial challenge3 to the validity of amendments to a declaration
of restrictive covenants, the reviewing court applies a presumption of validity and, to the
extent that the language allows, interprets provisions in a manner consistent with the
drafter's power to amend. See Stengl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976) ("a
construction giving an instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted
where reasonable, and between two possible constructions that will be adopted which
3. As is made clear in both its Amended Complaint (R. at 211/15-16) and its Trial
Brief (R. at 727/5-10), the Association is not challenging whether these provisions are
valid as applied to a certain project or activity. Rather, the Association requests that the
2002 Declaration be declared void ab initio. In order to make such a challenge, the
challenged provisions must be invalid in all of their applications. Cf. State v. Gallegos,
2009 UT 42, f 14, 220 P.3d 136 (explaining the difference between a facial and asapplied challenge to the constitutionality of a statute); Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 241
P.3d 1220, 1227 (Wash. 2010) (noting that an as-applied challenge does not render a
statute completely inoperative, in contrast to a facial challenge).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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establishes a valid contract.'5); Emerald Estates Community Assn, Inc. v. Gorodetzer, 819
So.2d 190, 193 (Fla. App. 2002) ("Restrictions found within a Declaration are afforded a
strong presumption of validity."); cf. I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110, f 25, 61 P.3d 1038
("we afford statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will, whenever
possible, construe a statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities."). In
determining the validity of the provisions, the reviewing court should not render advisory
opinions or settle "the hypothetical application of a [provision] to a situation in which the
parties might, at some future time, find themselves," but should stay within the limits of
settling "actual or imminent clashes of legal rights and obligations between the parties."
See Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981).
If the reviewing court determines that it cannot read the challenged provisions in
such a way as to sustain their validity, then the next step is determine whether the
challenged provisions (or language within those provisions)4 are severable from the
remainder of the declaration. See Viking Properties, Inc. v. Holm, 118 P.3d 322, 326-28
(Wash. 2005).5 A provision, term, or phrase is severable if it can be removed (1) while
leaving the remainder of the declaration grammatically intact, and (2) without affecting
the purpose, intent and operation of the declaration. Cf. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional
Law § 200 (2011) (Note 7 and surrounding text). Only if the reviewing court determines
4

The reviewing court should sever as narrowly as possible, and need not strike an
entire provision if striking only a certain term or phrase will render the provision valid.
See Vales v. Kings Hill Condominium Ass% 125 P.3d 381, 388-89 (Ariz. App. 2005)
(striking out a date from a provision to make a provision of a restrictive covenant valid);
cf. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §199 (2011) ("[A] court should refrain from
invalidating more of a statute than is necessary.").
5. Contrary to the Association's claim, the issue of severability was raised before the
trial court (R. at 733/16-17).
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that one or more of the challenged provisions cannot be harmonized and cannot be
severed will the court strike down the entire declaration.
The trial court did not follow these rules in determining the validity of the 2002
Declaration, and neither the trial court nor the Association has made it clear exactly
which sections of the 2002 Declaration are at issue, making it difficult to go through the
steps of construal and severance. However, for the benefit of this Court, Sky Ranch will
review what it believes are the challenged provisions in the 2002 Declaration.6
1. Commercial Development7 As explained in pages 21-23 of Sky Ranch's
Opening Brief, the amendments relating to commercial operations were reasonable
clarifications and adjustments that did not substantially expand Sky Ranch's right of
commercial development from the 1990 Declaration as amended8 and other agreements.9

6. As the Association does not attempt to defend the trial court's conclusion that the
taxiway maintenance provisions (Ex.6 §§ 1.23 & IV. 1) were impermissible, Sky Ranch
will not further address this subject in this brief.
7. See Ex.6 §§ 1.5 (defines "commercial"), 1.13 (defines "FBO"), VII.6 (reserves
right of Declarant to engage in commercial activity on non-residential lots), VII.8
(provides that quiet enjoyment rights do not limit right to commercial development),
VII. 16 (reserves right of Declarant to engage in commercial activity).
8. Comparing the provisions supra in Note 7 with Ex.5 §§ VII.6, VII. 16 and Ex.36
§ 9, Sky Ranch found the following changes: "Gas sales for both automobiles and
aircraft," "lodging units," and "a convenience store" were added to possible commercial
activities ("restaurant," "aircraft washing facility" and "aircraft repair" are listed in Ex.36
§ 9); § VII.6 was amended to add language allowing Declarant to conduct commercial
operations "in other locations in the development," as contemplated by Ex.36 § 9 and
other provisions; § VII.6 was amended to state that commercial operations shall not
unreasonably interfere or restrict the Owners' beneficial use and enjoyment of their
property "in the view of the Declarant"; § VII.8 was amended to provide that quiet
enjoyment rights could not be used to restrict Declarant's commercial operations; and
§ VII. 16 was amended to state that Declarant's right to conduct commercial activity was
not "subject to any time limit." While Sky Ranch believes that these are permissible
amendments, all of this language is easily severable.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In order to argue otherwise, the Association reads the 1990 Declaration as narrowly as
possible and the 2002 Declaration as broadly as possible. This is improper. As explained
above, the 2002 Declaration cannot be declared facially invalid based on speculation
about how the provisions might be abused in the future. Instead, it must be found invalid
in all of its applications. The Association does not show this.
Moreover, while the Association asserts that the 2002 Declaration "eviscerates all
other limitations that previously existed on Sky Ranch's power to engage in commercial
development," it provides no warrant for this claim. Specifically, the Association does
not explain the material difference between Sky Ranch being allowed to conduct "such
other business operations as it may deem necessary and appropriate," (Ex.5 § VII.6), and
Sky Ranch being allowed to develop "any other related facilities deemed appropriate or
desirable by the Declarant." (Ex.6 § I.13.)10 In fact, to the extent that either clause
provides an enforceable limit on the type or scope of commercial development,11 the
2002 Declaration appears to put more restrictions on Sky Ranch, as it refers to "related
facilities." Likewise, the Association's assertion that the 2002 Declaration "drops the

9. While the Association states that it contested Mr. Longley's testimony that an
FBO agreement existed (as explained on page 22 of Sky Ranch's opening brief), it does
not cite any record evidence that would have refuted Mr. Longley's testimony. While the
particular draft agreement was not admitted, Mr. Longley's unrefuted testimony was
sufficient to establish that an agreement existed.
10. As the phrase "necessary and appropriate" remains in the amended version of
§ VII.6 (see Ex.6 § VII.6), it is unlikely that a different wording in the definitions section
amounts to a material change.
11. Both Declarations expressly state that commercial development is not limited to
the examples given. (See Ex.5 § VII.6 (providing that commercial development allowed
"includ[es], but [is] not limited to" the listed purposes); Ex.6 § 1.13 (providing that the
FBO "may include, but is not limited to" the listed purposes).)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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limitation to keep business development consistent with the Association members'
beneficial use and enjoyment of their property" is without foundation in the text, as
discussed in pages 22-23 and footnote 13 of Sky Ranch's Opening Brief. Finally, the
Association's argument that the 2002 Declaration allows commercial development in any
way Sky Ranch "in its sole discretion deems to be appropriate" reads the language out of
context. The language the Association refers to is found in the property description
portion of the Declaration (Ex.6 § II), and refers to the scope of Sky Ranch's easements
and rights of way. This provision keeps the Association from restricting the right of way
to the commercial development, does not expand the scope of commercial development,
and is substantially similar to the language of the 1990 Declaration. (See Ex.5 § II.)
2. Expansion and Annexation.12 Contrary to the Association's assertion, the
1990 Declaration did not restrict expansion to a "small part of section 28." The 1990
Declaration stated that the "Property" included the land described in Exhibits A and B
(Phases I and II, respectively) and "such portions of additional land which may be
annexed to the Development as provided herein." (Ex.5 § 1.3; see also Ex.5 §§ XI. 1 &
XI.2(d).) In fact, the phases in the supplementary declarations, recorded before the 2002
Declaration, already went outside of Section 28. (See Ex.6 § 1.20 (showing dates that
phases were recorded); Ex.10-13 (showing that Phase 3 is in both Sections 28 and 33, and
that Phases 4, 5A and 5C are entirely in Section 33).) In fact, to the extent that it restricts
the land that can be annexed to Sections 28 and 33, the 2002 Declaration actually restricts
the rights of Sky Ranch far more than the 1990 Declaration. Finally, there is no record
evidence to show how much property could be further annexed into the Community in
12. See Ex.6 §§ 1.12 (defines "expandable land"), 1.21 (defines "property").
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Sections 28 and 33. Without this evidence, neither the trial court nor this Court can
determine how further annexation could fundamentally alter the character of the
community.
3. Hangar and Commercial Lots.13 Next, the Association complains that the
provisions allowing owners of hangar lots to use the airstrip "allows potentially hundreds
of additional people who do not even live at Grassy Meadows to use the airstrip" and
"transforms what was supposed to be a private airstrip . . . into the equivalent of a general
aviation airport open to hundreds of additional users." The Association also argues that
by expanding the definition of lots to include hangar lots and allowing further
commercial lots, Sky Ranch instituted an "altered voting scheme" that would "ensure[]
that Sky Ranch will always be able to at least outvote the residents of the Community,
even after its Class B status eventually terminates." These concerns are misplaced.
As explained in Page 21 of Sky Ranch's Opening Brief, the provisions for hangar
lots (and their voting rights) were already in the 1990 Declaration as amended by the
Phase 5C Declaration, which is not at issue. (See Ex.36 §§ 3 & 5.) Indeed, while the
Association alleges that Sky Ranch's observation that it had 203 votes14 to the other
members' 77 votes at the time of the 2002 Declaration (see Ex.6 § 111.2(a)) was solely
based on the lots that had been dedicated through Phase 5C. Essentially, they are
challenging the wrong declaration. The Association attempts to respond by stating that
13. See Ex.6 §§ 1.16 (defines "lot"), 1.17 (defines "member"), 1.19 (defines "owner"),
III.2 (sets forth the voting rights of owners of hangar lots and commercial lots), XI.l
(allows for annexation for additional "residential, hangar, or commercial lots"); XI.2
(provides that "there is no restriction regarding the number of hangar and commercial
units allowed").
14. Not lots, as the Association suggests.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"the 5C Declaration defined only the rights of hangar owners in 5C, not the owners of
hangars located elsewhere in the development, including the vast land expansion." As
explained above, there is no evidence of a "vast land expansion," and no evidence of
"hundreds of additional [hangar lot owners]" beyond Phase 5C. The Association is
arguing against a speculative injury without providing any evidence of its likelihood of
occurring. Furthermore, as explained above, there was nothing in the 1990 Declaration
that would have limited this "vast land expansion." The same goes for commercial lots.
The Association has not provided evidence of a vast expansion of commercial units, and
so its complaints are speculative. Further, the 1990 Declaration specifically stated that the
Declarant intended to develop further commercial lots. (See Ex.5 § VII.6.) Allowing
further hangar and commercial lots is consistent with the provisions 1990 Declaration as
amended15 and would not fundamentally alter the character of the Community.
4. Class B Voting Rights.16 The Association next argues that the 2002
Declaration impermissibly "resurrected" Class B voting rights. This is adequately
addressed in pages 24-25 of Sky Ranch's opening brief, and was not responded to in the
Association's brief.

15. See Ex.5 § XI.5 (providing that the 1990 Declaration includes all supplements).
16. See Ex.6 §§ III.2 (setting forth Class B voting rights, including voting rights for
hangar units owned by or held in trust for Sky Ranch), III.5 (providing for reinstatement
of Class B voting rights upon further expansion).
17. The Association's brief seems to imply that Sky Ranch surrendered its Class B
rights by signing the Association Bylaws. This is not supported by the evidence they
point to, as the document referred to was never entered into evidence and so cannot be
reviewed by this Court. Also, Mr. Longley makes clear in his testimony that he signed the
document under duress. (Tr.l 135:20-22.)
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5. Automatic Dismissal Clauses. The Association next argues that the automatic
dismissal clauses are impermissible amendments. These automatic dismissal clauses can
be divided into two categories: first, those that call for dismissal of a member of the
Board of Trustees for failing to recognize voting rights,18 and second, those that call for
dismissal of a member of the Board of Trustees for failing to properly perform his or her
duties.19 With respect to the first category, the Association's argument that these clauses
are "designed to chill a party's right to challenge illegal provisions [in the declaration]" is
incorrect. These clauses do not preclude contesting the voting provisions by seeking a
declaratory judgment or other legal action; they only prohibit the board from adjudicating
that issue on its own and requiring the Declarant or Class C member to seek an injunction
to enforce its rights. Therefore, while the Association is correct in that these clauses are
not the same as a will contest clause, that is only because, unlike in a will contest clause,
these clauses allow for a legal challenge without losing status. These clauses are designed
to better ensure the workability of the voting scheme and are therefore legitimate.
With respect to the second category, all of these clauses seek to provide a way for
a member of the Association, short of obtaining an injunction, to enforce the provisions
18. See Ex.6 § III.2 (providing that "it shall be cause for automatic dismissal from
membership on the Board of Trustees" to "fail to recognize Declarant's class B votes,
including those held in trust for Declarant," or "to fail to recognize the votes of any Class
C member."
19. See Ex.6 §§ V.2 (providing that "it shall be cause for automatic dismissal" to
spend assessments for purposes outside of those enumerated, including payment "to any
attorney or law firm to pursue any claim, assert any point of view or fund any lawsuit"
other than collection actions, without the consent of two-thirds of the Members), VI.2
(providing for automatic dismissal for failure to maintain the common areas and
taxiways), VI.5 (providing for automatic dismissal for failure to maintain the airstrip,
failure to pay the rental payments on the airstrip, or failing to sign the addendum to the
lease agreement to connect the airstrip to Phases 4, 5a, 5b, and 5c of the Development).
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of the Declaration. The Association does not argue that the underlying provisions are
reasonable and within the scope of the 1990 Declaration. An enforcement mechanism,
therefore, would simply be a way to "better insure . . . workability of the arrangement
which is contemplated by the Declaration," and so the clauses are legitimate.
6. Fee Provision.20 Contrary to the Association's claims, this provision does not
give Sky Ranch the ability to charge a fee for use of the airstrip. As stated in the opening
brief, this language was vague, as it is not clear whether the Declarant's ability to charge
fees is intended to apply to just the recreational facilities, or to the airstrip as well. Given
that Association members have the right to use the airstrip under the Airport Lease {see
Ex.1 § 1), and the Declarant is not the Airport Owner and has no interest in the airstrip, it
is not reasonable to read this provision as authorizing Sky Ranch to levy a fee for use of
the airstrip. As there is no evidence that Sky Ranch has attempted to charge Association
members for the use of the airstrip, any injury would be speculative.
7. Jets and Large Aircraft.21 This is adequately addressed in pages 26-27 of Sky
Ranch's opening brief. The provisions are subject to the Federal Aviation Regulations,
and are entirely severable at any rate.

20. See Ex.6 § IV.4(d) (providing that a member's right to enjoy the common areas is
subject to "the right of the Declarant or association to charge reasonable admission and
other fees of Association members for use of the airstrip or any recreational facilities
situated upon the common area.")
21. See Ex.6 §§ IV.2 (providing that the right to enjoy the common areas does not
preclude "jet or large aircraft operated by invitees from using the airstrip"); IV.4(e)
(same); IV.4(k) (same); VII.8 (providing that the right to quiet enjoyment "shall not
restrict the use of the airstrip by jet or large aircraft"); VII.22 (waiving a member's claim
"against use of the airstrip by aircraft, including jet and large aircraft").
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8. Restriction of Rulemaking Authority. Finally, the Association objects to two
of the restrictions placed on its rulemaking authority in the 2002 Declaration. (See Ex.6
§ XII.2.) First, it complains that the 2002 Declaration "makes it so any rule Sky Ranch
adopts regarding the airstrip will trump any inconsistent rule adopted by the Association
in perpetuity." It is true that the Airport Owner's rules regarding the airstrip will trump
inconsistent Association rules, and this makes sense, as the Airport Owner is the landlord
and the Association is the tenant. This power would not extend beyond the use of the
airstrip, however.
Second, the Association complains that the 2002 Delcaration gives Sky Ranch the
right to veto Association rules until both (1)15 years has elapsed from the date of
recording, and (2) Declarant's Class B voting rights had lapsed. (See Ex.6 § XII.2.)
However, this is another reasonable amendment. As the Association itself pointed out,
the 1990 Declaration provided that the Declarant had to approve all amendments while its
Class B voting rights were extent. (Ex.5 § XII.3.) As the rulemaking authority of the
Association is merely an extension and elaboration of its powers under the Declaration,
this provision is not a substantive shift of power between the Association and the
Declarant; it just codifies a different procedure for exercising that power. The only part of
this provision that may be questionable is the possibility of extending the provision
beyond the time when Declarant's Class B voting rights lapse. However, even if this
Court found that retaining the right beyond that time would be unacceptable, the Court
can merely strike out the words "During the 15 year period following the date on which
this Second Restated, Supplementary Amended Declaration is filed for the record in the
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Office of the County Recorder of Washington County, Utah, or" and "whichever is
longer," leaving the provision grammatically and functionally sound.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY DECISION ON
SKY RANCH'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE FBO AGREEMENT AND TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS, AND INSTRUCT THE TRIAL COURT
TO TAKE EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE.

Because the trial court had earlier agreed to allow Sky Ranch to produce evidence
on the issue at a later date, the trial court's decision to summarily decide the issue of
whether the Association was liable for damages for opposing the FBO before the
Washington County Planning Commission was a violation of Sky Ranch's right to due
process. In its brief, the Association appears to concede that the trial court's
determination that the Association had no contractual obligation not to oppose [Sky
Ranch's] effort to change the zoning ordinances applicable to the Airport and
community" (R. at 741/21) is in error, and defends the trial court's decision based only
on the argument that "the Association could not be liable for tortious interference as a
matter of law." However, the Association fails to address the fact that the NoerrPennington doctrine does not apply, as it waived its right of petition by contract.
First, however, the Association attempts to discount the impropriety of the trial
court's decision, but to no avail. The Association argues that the trial court only agreed to
give Sky Ranch more time to produce evidence "if necessary." This is a
misrepresentation of the trial court's statement. In the statement that the Association
refers to, the trial court acknowledges that there was no time to present Sky Ranch's case
for tortious interference and asks counsel how they should proceed. (Tr.2 170:6-15.)
After Sky Ranch's counsel indicates that he would rather come back and submit evidence
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on the tortious interference issue rather than attempt to present evidence that day (Tr.2
170:18-171:9), the conversation on the record is as follows:
THE COURT: Okay. Then do you want me to try to work up some—of
course, starting with your proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
do you want me to do those on the part of the trial I've heard, or do you
want to reserve all of that and have one set offindingsand conclusions?
MR. SMITH: I was going to say go forward.
MR. HOOLE: I think based on evidence that's come in, I would probably
request submit a revised version. But I think I need to conform some of
thosefindingsthat I would propose to the Court based upon the evidence
that's actually been admitted so.
THE COURT: And then do that and then later try, if necessary, the issue of
damages and tortious interference?
MR. SMITH: Tortious interference I think is in play no matter what we do.
THE COURT: Right.
(Tr.2 171:10-172:1.) As is obviousfromthe transcript, the trial court acknowledged that
it would take evidence on the issue of tortious interference at a later date, not just "if
necessary," as the Association claims.
The Association also argues that there was argument from both parties regarding
the issue of tortious interference in their closing arguments. However, as shown earlier,
the trial court had previously agreed to take further evidence on the issue. In response to
the Association's unilaterally raising this issue in its closing (Tr.2 182:13-183:18), Sky
Ranch responded that the issue was "premature because we haven't had a chance to put
our evidence on about tortious interference." (Tr.2 205:14-16.) Sky Ranch simply did not
have proper notice or the opportunity to make a considered response with the benefit of
evidence and legal argument, and the trial court's ruling on this issue was therefore
improper.
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More importantly, the trial court's decision was incorrect as a matter of law, as
there was evidence presented at trial that the Association had a contractual obligation not
to interfere with development of the FBO area. While the Association argues that it is
immunized from liability for its breach of this obligation under the First Amendment, it
does not address the fact that it is well-established law that First Amendment rights can
be waived or bargained away by contract.
Rather than attempt to shoehorn the Noerr-Pennington doctrine onto contract law,
the Association tries to avoid the issue altogether by arguing that "[i]nstead of suing the
Association for breaching this alleged agreement..., Sky Ranch sued the Association
for tortious interference of contract," concluding that this is fatal to Sky Ranch's claim.
The Association's argument is without basis in fact or law. First, even a cursory glance at
the pleadings shows that Sky Ranch's counterclaim asserts causes of action for "Tortious
Interference with Business Relations" and "Breach of Contract—FBO Agreement." (R. at
489/12-16.)23 Second, even if Sky Ranch had misidentified the legal theory under which
22. In addition to the authority cited for this proposition in Point II.B of Appellant's
opening brief, see also Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
valid waiver of First Amendment rights in labor agreement); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v.
City ofErie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1094-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding valid contractual waiver of
First Amendment rights); ITT Telecom Prods. Corp. v. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780
(Cal. App. 1989) (explaining that "it is possible to waive even First Amendment free
speech rights by contract"); In re Steinberg, 195 Cal. Rptr. 613, 616-18 (Cal. App. 1983)
(finding waiver of First Amendment rights by filmmaker); cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-71 (1991) (holding that, notwithstanding First Amendment
concerns, a promise of non-disclosure could be enforced under a theory of promissory
estoppel).
23. As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Leigh Furniture v. Isom, "a breach of
contract committed for the immediate purpose of injuring the other contracting party"
gives rise to a cause of action for tortious interference with business relations. 657 P.2d
293, 309 (Utah 1982).
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it was entitled to relief, this would not be a fatal flaw, as Utah law requires only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to
state a cause of action, Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), and that "everyfinaljudgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings," Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1).24 Rule 54(c)(1)
highlights the reason why the trial court's decision to grant judgment based only on the
closing arguments was in error: without allowing Sky Ranch the opportunity to either
present its facts at trial or to provide the trial court with considered points and authorities
supporting its legal theories, Utah's policy in favor of liberal pleading and resolving
disputes on their merits would be frustrated. This Court should reverse the trial court's
judgment and instruct the trial court to take evidence on this issue.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT SKY RANCH
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO TERMINATE THE LEASE AND INSTRUCT THE TRIAL
COURT TO DECLARE THE LEASE TERMINATED AND TO DETERMINE DAMAGES.

As stated in Sky Ranch's Opening Brief, the trial court erred in finding that the
Association was not in material breach of the lease and that Sky Ranch was precluded
from terminating the lease for failure to give proper notice. Rather than providing this
Court with any helpful argument or analysis, and rather than responding to the points
made in Sky Ranch's Opening Brief, the Association repeats the findings and conclusions

24. See also Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, ^ 38, 127 P.3d 1224 ("Rule 54(c)(1)
requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding appropriate relief justified by the facts
developed at trial, as long as the failure to request a particular form of relief does not
prejudice a party in the preparation or trial of the case."); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding that the federal equivalent of the rule
ensures that "a party's misconception of the legal theory of his case does not work a
forfeiture of his legal rights.").
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of the trial court without analysis, including a five-page stretch of its brief where it copied
and pasted the trial court's findings. Therefore, rather than rehash its arguments, Sky
Ranch will refer the Court to the following pages of its Opening Brief: pages 46-47
explain that the trial court improperly raised the issue of delivering notice sua sponte and
that the content of the notice, along with prior communications, was adequate to inform
the Association of the breaches that needed to be cured. Pages 33-46 marshal the
evidence underlying the trial court's findings that the Association had substantially
complied with the lease, and point out the fatal flaw in the trial court's reasoning.25

25. Contrary to the Association's accusation, Sky Ranch properly marshaled the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. First, it is important to note that the
marshaling burden is intended to be directed to the general or ultimate findings of the
trial court, rather than the subsidiary findings. See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,
1Hf 24-25, 112 P.3d 495. Sky Ranch challenged the trial court's findings that (1) the
runway was properly maintained, (2) the lighting system was properly maintained, (3) the
weeds, fences, and general maintenance of the airport was properly maintained, and (4)
the insurance provisions of the lease were substantially complied with. Sky Ranch treated
subsidiary findings by the trial court as evidence in favor of those ultimate findings
(except where Sky Ranch challenged the accuracy of the subsidiary finding), and
provided further evidence not mentioned by the trial court where applicable. This
satisfies Sky Ranch's burden "to correlate particular items of evidence with the
challenged findings and convince [the appeals court] of the [lower] court's missteps in
application of the evidence to its findings." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.,
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
In fact, the Association's accusation that Sky Ranch failed to marshal is ironic,
given its failure to properly fulfill its own burdens under the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. First, the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts in its brief are nearly
devoid of citations to the record as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(e). Second, while the
Association mentions "a number of affidavits and deposition transcripts" and "other
record evidence not cited by the trial court," it does not give a citation to this evidence
nor explain the content of this evidence. In order to prove its accusation that Sky Ranch
failed to marshal, all the Association has to do is cite "a scintilla of evidence supporting
the district court's ruling." Parduhn, 2005 UT 22 at f 25. By not fulfilling even this
nominal burden, the Association shows that it, not Sky Ranch, is the party seeking to
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Finally, pages 47-48 explain why Sky Ranch was not equitably estopped from
terminating the lease (a point which the Association appears to have conceded).
While not dispositive of the issues, there are four points that were made in the
Association's brief that merit a response. First, the Association claims that it had no
responsibility to overlay or resurface the airstrip. The Airport Lease states that "Lessee
may make improvements to the common areas, such as resurfacing the runway, or as the
need or purpose of the Lesee arises, upon approval of the Lessor, which approval shall
not be unreasonably withheld." (Ex.1 § 6.) While the Association claims that the word
"may" indicates that they had no responsibility to resurface the runway, this is not a
tenable interpretation given the nature and purpose of the lease. First, the lease was for 99
years. (Ex.1 at 2.) However, asphalt has a lifespan of only 20 years. (Tr.2 72:4.)
Therefore, in order for the airstrip to remain a functional and valuable asset, one of the
parties had the responsibility to resurface the airstrip. The lease makes very clear that the
lease was "as-is" (Ex.1 § 1) and a "triple-net lease with no costs payable by the Lessor."
(Ex.1 § 8.) See Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C. v. Brown Family Holdings, L.L.C., 2011
UT 9, Tflj 40-42, 248 P.3d 452 (holding that a triple-net provision allocates all expenses
relating to the property to the lessee). Without any specific provision showing that the
Lessor was responsible for resurfacing, that burden is allocated to the Lessee. Therefore,
the section of the Airport Lease referred to by the Association must be read to refer to
resurfacing that substantially improves the airstrip from its original state at the beginning
of the lease period, not resurfacing that is required to keep the airstrip in working order.
"dump the burden of argument and research" on this Court. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d
487, 491 (Utah App. 1992).
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Second, the Association claims that Sky Ranch did not prove that it was damaged.
This is simply false. As shown in Sky Ranch's Opening Brief, the Association was
allowing economic waste on the premises. The very example that the Association uses in
its brief—Mr. Longley's testimony that he spent about $12,000 on cleaning up weeds and
oiling fences—is sufficient to prove the fact of damage. As the issue of the amount of
damages was reserved for another proceeding (Tr.l 21:3-17), it is understandable that
there was not a great deal of evidence submitted on that subject, and in fact, to the extent
that the question of how substantially Sky Ranch was damaged comes into play in
determining substantial compliance, it was inappropriate of the trial judge to make the
finding without hearing testimony on damages.
Third, the Association argues that as there were no further allegations of breaches
in the record after the termination of the lease, this somehow proves that the breaches
were insubstantial. This is a misreading of the fourth factor in determining substantial
compliance, which asks whether breaches were cured within a reasonable timeframe. As
the breaches in this lease were subject to notice and time to cure, the factor does not
apply. Further, the Association's point is nonsensical—first, there cannot be a breach of a
lease that is already terminated, as this one was, and second, any other complaints about
what happened after the date of termination would not be relevant to the proceedings
before the trial court.
Finally, the Association claims that it would suffer disproportionately from the
termination of the lease. This does not take into account the fact that Sky Ranch does not
have anyone else to lease the land to. There may be renegotiations, and the parties would
likely enter into a different agreement than the one before, but as Sky Ranch's trial
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counsel said, Sky Ranch "can't pick up the runway and take it somewhere else." (Tr.2
205:3-4.) While termination was not an ideal remedy for Sky Ranch, it is the only remedy
that was afforded to it by the Airport Lease for the Association committing waste on the
property.
IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE FUNDS
HELD IN ESCROW CONSTITUTED FULL PAYMENT OF THE AIRPORT LEASE
THROUGH DECEMBER 3 1 , 2010 AND INSTRUCT THE TRIAL COURT TO TAKE
EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE.

In its Opening Brief, Sky Ranch argued that the trial court's ruling that the funds
held in escrow by the trial court constituted full payment for the Airport Lease through
December 31, 2010 was in error, as the issue was not properly before the trial court. The
Association has two responses to Sky Ranch's argument: first, it says that the issue was
presented to the trial court, relying on one sentence in an exhibit to Sky Ranch's
counterclaim. Second, it claims that the trial court's ruling would constitute harmless
error "given the doctrine of res judicata and Sky Ranch's obligation to assert all
compulsory counterclaims . . . . " The Association's responses misconstrue both the
nature of the trial court's ruling and the principles ofres judicata.
As Sky Ranch pointed out in its opening brief, the issue of the sufficiency of the
funds held in escrow was never raised in the pleadings and was not tried by the implied
consent of the parties. The Association makes no attempt to argue that the issue was tried

26. The Association also raises the point that "this issue was not raised in Sky Ranch's
docketing statement." As the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, failure to raise an
issue in a docketing statement does not affect an appellant's right to raise the issue in its
opening brief. Nelson ex rel Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1996).
Thus, the Association's failure to develop this point is understandable.
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by implied consent, but makes a half-hearted attempt to argue that because Sky Ranch
had appended the March 31, 2003 Notice of Termination as an exhibit to its
counterclaim, and because the exhibit stated that "the lease fee specified in section 3 has
frequently been overdue over the years, and is currently past due," (Ex.2, as referenced in
R. at 489/5), the issue of the sufficiency of the escrow funds was therefore presented for
the trial court's decision. First, this argument overlooks the purpose for which the exhibit
was introduced by the counterclaim. The counterclaim incorporated the exhibit for the
purpose of showing that it had been sent, not to make allegations as to the reasons for
terminating the lease. (R. at 489/5.) Further, the exhibit was a notice to cure—only those
items listed that were not cured within 30 days after the notice would be reasons for
termination. That exhibit could not provide allegations to support the termination of the
lease, as it was created 30 days before any termination took place. But most importantly,
even if this sentence in the exhibit had brought up the issue of whether the Association
was past due on its lease payments as of March 31, 2003, that does not raise the issue of
whether the lease payments paid into the trial court constitute full payment for the period
between May of 2003 and December of 2010.
Next, the Association argues that, even if the issue was not pleaded, the trial
court's ruling constitutes harmless error. Sky Ranch, it argues, had an obligation to raise
the issue under Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the failure to do so
barred it from adjudicating the issue later. This argument fails for the same reason: the
adequacy of lease payments prior to the date of termination of the lease is not the same
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issue as the adequacy of payments for the lease deposited after the date of termination of
the lease.
Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a counterclaim be
brought "if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing parties claim

" The subject matter before the trial court was whether Sky

Ranch had the right to terminate the Airport Lease as of May of 2003. Therefore, it would
be proper for Sky Ranch to present all of its claims relating to that question, including
whether the Association had not tendered full payment to Sky Ranch up until that date.
However, the question of whether the funds held in escrow constituted full lease
payments from May of 2003 to December of 2010 is not within the subject matter of the
Association's complaint. Further, it would be an after-acquired counterclaim, which Utah
R. Civ. P. 13(d) makes clear is permissive rather than compulsory. Because any claim for
an accounting of the rent due on the Airport Lease after the date of termination would not
have been ripe until the issue of whether the termination was valid was settled, Sky
Ranch could not have brought the claim that the Association now claims was barred.
Because the issue of whether thefiindsheld in escrow were adequate to fully pay the rent
under the Airport Lease was not properly before the trial court, this Court should reverse
the trial court's judgment and instruct the trial court to determine the proper distribution
of the deposit held in court. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deposits in Court §§ 15 & 17 (2011)
(describing the proper procedure for distributing deposits held in court).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Sky Ranch respectfully asks this Court to reverse the
trial court's decision and remand with instructions as requested.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of December, 2011.
/S/ Nathan Whittaker
Nathan Whittaker
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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